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INTERVIEW 
 
Changing the Subject 
Cressida J. Heyes, University of Alberta 
Michael McGarry, OISE/University of Toronto1 
 
Michael McGarry: Foucault once offered that ‚The main interest in life and work is to become 
someone else that you were not at the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would 
say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it?‛2 You take up this challenge as 
you locate yourself in your work. It’s a risky strategy. I wonder if this practice has shifted your sense of 
your freedom and agency, both in your scholarship and generally. 
 
Cressida J. Heyes: The process of writing has always been deeply satisfying to me, and I write 
quite a bit of creative non-fiction and journalistic material as well as academic prose.  (I would 
love to try more seriously with fiction, too.)  For me what’s great—and agonising—about wri-
ting is the way it throws you up against the knots in your thinking and forces you to unravel 
stuff you might have become smug or lazy about.  So I think that the best philosophical work 
is written from a genuine desire to work through some of the struggles that beset living with-
out any prior commitment to a particular outcome.  Once you know what you are going to say 
and who you’ll be in the saying—well, then you have said it, and that’s who you are!  For both 
these reasons I think that Foucault is quite right to say that (good, real) writing can only be 
transformative of its author and lead to new places, intellectually and personally.  But I don’t 
know whether there’s anything especially courageous about it, or even risky, because I don’t 
feel I have a lot of choice in the matter.  Other ways of doing philosophy don’t appeal to me 
and I have no vocation for them.  I was lucky to be able to carve out a rather fraught, tiny 
niche in the academic world where there is just enough sympathy and interest in what I do 
that I can survive doing it.  In fact, I’ve learned that in academia the stakes are so small (as the 
saying goes) that really I can—speaking of course as a privileged tenured professor in a fairly 
laissez-faire workplace—do almost whatever I want.  I have realised that my investment in 
myself as someone who takes political risks is wildly disproportionate to the significance of 
                                                 
1 This exchange is one of a series of dialogues that followed the Agency after Foucault conference, which was 
held in 2007 at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. 
2 Rux Martin, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman 
and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 
9. 
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what I actually do, and that realisation is sobering but also quite freeing.  So I pretty much say 
what I have to say, although sometimes my superego is horrified by what comes out.  
 
MM: In your book Self-Transformations3 you investigate the possibility of learning to creatively 
conceptualize normalizing interventions such as cosmetic surgery and dieting in ways that refuse their 
limiting aspects and begin to rethink embodied identity in compassionate terms.  However, when spea-
king of any form of normalization as an ambiguous source of agency the idea of complicity persists. At 
the Agency After Foucault conference, Lynda Stone suggested that this may be why Foucault’s wri-
tings express a sort of ‚warning‛ about agency.  Barbara Applebaum reflected this suggestion when she 
spoke of white complicity with racist strategies despite attempts to act in non-prejudicial ways.  What 
are your thoughts about complicity? Perhaps you might talk about it in terms of the bodily modifica-
tions that you consider in Self-Transformations? In particular, do you think it’s possible to practice 
such modifications without complicity with patriarchy or gender biases? 
 
CJH: The short answer is “no.”  I think partly because normalization is what we’re made of, as 
well as what we resist, we’re never going to be able to do anything with our normalized 
bodies that isn’t somehow implicated in power structures that contribute to our own oppres-
sion.  Those who don’t buy into this claim risk a bit of hubris, I think: Foucault often alludes 
sardonically to people who think that they are being subversive, and thereby get trapped in a 
normalizing script—albeit one that they perceive as somehow resistant or counter-cultural.  
The risks of complicity with oppressive norms are perhaps hardest to spot when one is righ-
teously convinced that one is being a good feminist, anti-racist, or whatever, and Foucault is 
right to point this out to us.  I think it’s an interesting feature of our habitual practices of aca-
demic critique, actually, that Foucault’s theoretical interlocutors get so exercised about the 
idea that complicity and resistance are inseparable.  (Of course this makes political strategy 
tremendously difficult, but that’s the interesting political challenge, and people do things all 
the time that strike me as interestingly resistant and transformative.)  Rather troubling to me 
are the endless philosophical debates about “agency,” within which the fascination with speci-
fication of certain idealised conditions of possibility for free speech or action take precedence 
over theorising the messier world of political practice.  That’s why I say in Self-Transformations 
that I am interested in what people actually do, rather than whether they can, in theory, do it.  
I need to say more about this in future, I realise, but for now I think that remaining on one’s 
toes about the risks of complicity and the limits of agency while still trying to make political 
interventions into institutions is, practically speaking, a skill-set that I’m very interested in 
developing. 
 
MM: You remark that ‚it becomes increasingly difficult in a culture that sells every technology as a 
form of ‘creative self-fashioning’ to know how to remain a step ahead of normalization, rather than des-
perately hanging from its coattails.‛ [ST 125]  Yet because we are always subject to normalizing forces 
                                                 
3 Cressida J. Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007).  Further references to this book are given in parentheses in the text as ST, followed by page 
numbers. 
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remaining a step ahead means being subject to more and increasingly powerful normalizing forces. So 
what I’m interested in here is the idea that anyone engaging in ‘creative self-fashioning’ as a matter of 
freedom, especially when starting from a subjugated social and political position, will only have more 
struggles to look forward to as they get ever more insistent or practiced at becoming who they wish to 
be, calling, in turn, for more resistance. There appears to be more at stake than, as Foucault claims, 
finding freedom in ‚knowing the game is yours to play.‛4 Is there a ‘way out’ of this picture or does 
desiring a way out risk falling back into humanistic discussions about what you refer to as the ‚arche-
types of authenticity?‛ [ST 5]  
 
CJH: I’m not sure that this process does involve being ever-more subject to normalization: I 
think the point is to detach one’s increased capacities from the intensification of disciplinary 
power to some extent (as per “What is Enlightenment?”).5  Part of my argument is that norma-
lizing forces are politically educative: one can look at the skills one has developed through 
being disciplined and turn them against the institutions that cultivated them in the first place.  
Of course the skills have a tricky relation to the subjectivity: if the example is, I went to Weight 
Watchers and learned how to plan ahead to achieve my goals, that seems quite useful in a va-
riety of political contexts.  But sometimes in our contexts this practice of planning and goal-
setting and disciplining oneself sediments a subject-position that is itself contrary to other po-
litical goals (being open to process in democratic deliberation, for example) and makes one 
politically vulnerable in other respects (perhaps I may come to fetishize control of my life in 
ways that straighten my ability to be compassionate to others who don’t obviously exhibit 
self-discipline.)  Figuring out how to separate these things is a tremendously complicated 
game to play, and a place where practices of deep self-awareness meet one’s life as a citizen.  
As for the endless nature of it all…  Well, there just are always “more struggles to look forward 
to,” but perhaps they will be struggles in which our deepest commitments are a little closer to 
the things we are struggling against.  
 
MM: When addressing the tension between lines similar to those drawn in my previous question, Niko-
las Rose offers the notion of a ‚new humanism‛ that starts with the Foucauldian view that ‚humans are 
essentially machinated‛ and follows with the correlative idea that freedom would involve ‚an ascetics 
based upon… the constant detachment of culturally given codes in order to practice a life of constant 
moral experimentation.‛  He even suggests a ‚normativity‛ for this view that ‚would positively value 
all stratagems, tactics and practices that enhance human beings’ capacities to act‛ while subjecting ‚all 
that reduces such capacities to critical scrutiny.‛6  This implies the kind of endless agonistic critique ad-
vocated by Foucault in ‚What Is Enlightenment?‛  Yet it is possible that such ‘endlessness’ entails or 
risks an indefinite discontinuity of the self. I think you refer to this in Self-Transformations when you 
talk about how ‚Embracing this deep uncertainty about who we are and who we are becoming is likely 
                                                 
4 Quoted in James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1993), 352. 
5 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Robert Hurley (trans.), Essential Works of 
Foucault Volume I: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth (New York: The New Press, 1997), 303-319. 
6 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 96-97. 
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to be a journey through tremendous fear.‛ [ST 120]  With this in mind, do you see a necessarily more 
treacherous and fearful path of identity formation for those who are struggling with normalization from 
a feminist, post-colonial or critical-race perspective? Is there an alternative for those who Nancy Fraser7 
and Nancy Hartsock8 have in mind in their criticism of the normative implications of Foucault’s ideas 
on power and subjectivity? 
 
CJH: I imagine you are referring to the charge that the ability of oppressed subjects to take an 
identity-based, self-determining stand on their own behalf is undercut by ill-timed scepticism 
about the “old humanisms.”  I respect the political theoretical worry here, and also I know the 
feeling—even Foucauldians sometimes make claims about “who we are” that provoke irri-
tating, bad-faith responses from political dilettantes who just want to pick things apart instead 
of building.  But I have not found that political formations that solidify “who we are” really of-
fer very much solace.  Becoming attached to particular self-identities as central to our politics 
clearly has its limitations.  Of course, the positive affect of being around like-minded others is 
not something I object to! I’m not against collective action—far from it.  Rather I think if we 
genuinely want to widen certain possibilities for action, we must build political spaces for 
those new possibilities.  (This just seems like a truism of politics.)  Where I perhaps part com-
pany from Foucault and Rose (although this isn’t obviously the case) is in holding to some 
normative analysis around what possibilities are currently more difficult, why, and for whom.  
So simply making more possibilities for action could actually mean anything (and in that sen-
se Rose’s words need a context): my ultra-Conservative MP claims to be helping Canadians to 
feel “safe” by promising to “clean up our streets” and “put criminals behind bars—and keep 
them there.”  Yet I interpret his rhetoric as a kind of radical Othering of the criminal that func-
tions only to conceal the damages done by more commonplace acts of violence than he ima-
gines, as well as to continue to generate criminality as an exaggerated threat against which his 
policies will protect us.  It must be, though, given that he keeps being elected, that many of my 
neighbours also feel enabled by the promise of “safe streets” and perhaps walk the dog on a 
winter evening with some greater degree of comfort.  This is a possibility for action, but at 
what price, and wasn’t it a possibility that was there beforehand if only we could understand 
it as such?  Most interpreters of Foucault are on the left, and hold similar views, but we have 
not been very bold, I think, about engaging the debates about crypto-normativity in praxis-
oriented ways. 
Nonetheless, at the level of the individual I don’t think this demand for normative 
claims that we can stand behind translates into a unified and self-certain subjectivity.  
Working together on projects to which we have normative commitments is likely to make us 
into unpredictably different kinds of people.  Because so much of our psychic safety in popu-
lar and philosophical self-narratives is organised around certainty about the subjectivity we’ll 
end up with, this is bound to be unattractive, counter-intuitive, and fear-inducing. Conserva-
                                                 
7 Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1989). 
8 Nancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?” in Linda Nicholson (ed.), Feminism/ 
Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1998), 157-175. 
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tives who “know” that they are not-criminal, that they are Good Citizens, that their “families” 
and “values” will be protected by growing the prison-industrial complex, enjoy a great deal of 
confidence—I would say arrogance—about who they are.  Ironically, it’s a threatened subjec-
tivity, of course, but threatened by something (allegedly) outside the self.  To be threatened by 
a sense that political work will involve personal transformation is a different kind of ego 
threat.  The quote you’ve picked out from Self-Transformations is just the smallest gesture to-
ward work I’m now doing in which I try to make this point via the language of “political 
spirituality.” 
 
MM: Is it possible that self-discipline and creative self-formation are the most effective forms of agency? 
And, if so, how might their individualistic form be translated into collective political agency? More spe-
cifically, in terms of pedagogy, is it possible to exemplify for pedagogical purposes an ethics of self-care 
in such a manner that it inspires collective resistance? Or, is collective agency strictly a matter of local 
battles that have to be conceived and fought by groups in specific situations and not according to the 
potentially programmatic disciplinary pronouncements of experts and authority figures? I suppose this 
brings back into play Fraser’s and Hartsock’s concerns, also expressed by Habermas’ charge of ‚cryp-
tonormativism‛—that is, Foucault cannot answer the question ‚why fight?‛9 Do you have any further 
comments on these concerns? 
 
CJH: I don’t know that I’ve ever claimed that “self-discipline and creative self-formation” are 
the most effective forms of agency, or that I’ve systematically taxonomised agency in a way 
that would justify this claim.  Actually I find it a bit hard to get interested, philosophically 
speaking, in the more abstract debates about agency where such arguments would be made, 
and I don’t think this is just a matter of intellectual focus.  It has to do with my method, and its 
sense that working through examples (in writing) and trying out strategies (in political life) is 
where we discover and create the forms and limits of our agency.  In a short interview I can’t 
set out a bunch of such examples for you, although I think I’ve given some pointers in 
describing the work I’m doing now.  If one thinks like this, then agency can by definition ne-
ver be an individual matter; it just makes no sense to talk about what I can do without 
reference to my intersubjective constitution as well as my participation in shared interventions 
in politics.  What agency is will be discovered through political activity, not prior to it (or inde-
pendent of it).  I think of agency as a practice, rather than a state—in the same way Foucault 
talks about freedom, and obviously these two terms are closely tied.  Does it have any epi-
stemic or political traction, on this view, for an “expert” to make a “programmatic pronounce-
ment” about what our agency might consist in?  Not really.  Sometimes when we act politi-
cally it’s useful to apply a little hard thinking to our self-conception, for sure.  For example, I 
was talking with my students about some ways we might embrace aspects of femininity while 
also challenging gender oppression.  The view that doing “what you want” (we were talking 
about dodgy practices like cosmetic surgery) is just OK and that we needn’t think about how 
we are constituted through norms even as we resist them when they stop us doing “what we 
                                                 
9 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, The MIT Press, 1990), 284. 
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want” still has some popularity!  But of course concepts of false consciousness (from Mar-
xism), assujettissement (from the tradition in which Foucault writes), denial (from psycho-
analysis) still have to be dealt with—as very practical matters that influence our collective 
action no less than our individual self-understanding.  Why fight?  Well, as I’ve said, I’m more 
comfortable with normative commitments than Foucault and I think we fight because as 
members of groups on whom normalization works in particularly aggressive and constraining 
ways we find ourselves held back from meaningful self-government qua determination of our 
own shared lives and the creation of conditions of possibility for becoming new kinds of 
subjects.  I don’t see why this claim should belong to the liberals—in the sense that it has to be 
accompanied by the full panoply of liberal metaphysics and politics. 
 
MM: Challenges to normalization and the programmatic have taken many different forms in your 
work—for example, the Blizzard teaching award you and your colleagues received for your 
‘supersection’ Introduction to Philosophy course. Most would imagine that large classes lead to poor 
student ex-periences, yet you managed to make philosophy, one of the most individualistic subjects, 
effective in a large section. Was your experiment in this kind of teaching influenced by the same ideas 
you bring to your investigation of the effects of institutionalized power and forms of normalization such 
as cosmetic surgery and dieting? Also, are there any other ideas you have regarding the application of 
normalizing techniques for growing capabilities among individual students in larger classes and in 
other pedagogical contexts? 
 
CJH: When I was co-teaching that very big first-year class I was in charge of training graduate 
teaching assistants, and I noticed that the more pedagogically sympathetic among them had 
fallen prey to the mistaken belief that disciplinary power is only oppressive.  They thought 
that teaching without structure or rules was “liberating,” or that imposing their beliefs on stu-
dents was “wrong.”  They couldn’t see the enabling aspects of being a disciplined and disci-
plining teacher, which do include, I think, a certain clarity about what is expected of students 
and what is actually going on in the classroom.  The point is not to avoid structure in teaching 
but to make that structure explicit; the point is not to pretend you don’t have beliefs but rather 
to make them visible and model challenging and refining your own positions.  So I think the 
emphasis Foucault places on the Janus-headed nature of disciplinary power is quite useful, 
perhaps especially when you have to teach a big lecture class that involves a lot of organi-
zational skills and needs “leadership.”  
Other aspects of teaching I just find repulsive from any Foucauldian perspective.  
When you are grading 250 people you see how they organise themselves around a bell curve, 
and how the top end of the curve is called an “A” and the bottom is called a “D.”  Then you 
hear students saying things like “I am an A student, how could I get a B-?” and sometimes you 
have to say, “the average student in this class will get a B- so this is not surprising.”  Finally, 
you see someone who was perhaps once at the top of a completely different population 
struggling to redefine their entire self-identity around this new population, and you wonder, 
“why are we playing this particular game?”  Normalizing judgment is all about telling people 
who they are relative to a changing peer group, fostering the practice of self-judgment and 
judgment of others in ways that require constant rethinking, but often masquerade under 
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essentialising rhetorics.  It is this kind of observation that led me to experiment much more 
self-consciously with contemplative practices in education, including practices that cultivate 
detachment from outcomes and from destructive self-identities, while still increasing students’ 
capacities.  In fact, I’ve written a paper about this with a couple of my students, now pub-
lished in the journal Teaching Philosophy.10 
 
MM: Do you have any other ideas on how Foucault’s ideas can be put to work in the classroom? 
 
CJH: I think that Foucault’s work invites reflection on many pedagogical aspects of assujet-
tissement: might it be a more honest way to teach if we were explicit about the struggles we 
have with disciplining our students and turning them into certain kinds of subject?  When I’m 
teaching I often talk through my pedagogical methods in this voice, partly because I’m a scho-
lar of Foucault, to point out how (for example) in insisting on certain kinds of skill develop-
ment to certain standards I am both enabling students to do certain things (ask a good critical 
question, perhaps) while constraining and punishing them (giving them a D for doing it badly, 
or refusing to accept interpretive dance as an alternative assignment).  I am more self-con-
scious than ever about how teaching feminism in particular requires that many students be 
talked out of a popular ersatz liberalism that they find deeply seductive, but that the process 
of learning alternative political languages is profoundly personally unmooring for students.  
In the relatively sheltered haven of the university feminist theory class I find it easy to get 
irritated with students for being so “conservative” but when I ask more careful questions I 
often discover that students are viewed as politically radical by their peers or family, and have 
been ostracised for espousing views that seem terribly mild-mannered from inside my world. 
Some kind of commitment to the view that norms are constitutive makes this seem like a pres-
sing ethical problem: we are not just showing students how to be more free by opening their 
eyes to feminist politics, but rather we may be undoing the kinds of people they are without 
providing anything much of an alternative.  This provokes (for them as for me in writing) 
significant anger, fear, and doubt, and thus poses a dilemma that I suspect Chemistry pro-
fessors don’t worry about nearly as much.  Finally, studying Foucault on bio-power and the 
political body has made me much bolder about introducing bodies to teaching in practical 
rather than abstract ways: I once taught a course that combined physical movement (mostly 
yoga) with reading and discussion, and I’m interested in the ways that the built environment 
of education, our relation to space and movement, and our political possibilities are played 
out through embodied practices.  It’s quite odd to teach Discipline and Punish or History of Sexu-
ality and discuss the examples from education that litter those texts without thinking about 
how we as students and teachers are rendered “docile” and how we might make bodily 
assujettissement more perspicuous.  I think in my new project—which is closely linked to peda-
gogical questions—I will want to make my brand of Foucauldian work more phenomeno-
logical as well as more explicitly practical when it comes to teaching. 
 
                                                 
10 Natalie Helberg, Cressida J. Heyes, and Jaclyn Rohel, “Thinking Through the Body: Philosophy, Yoga, and 
Physical Education,” Teaching Philosophy 32, no. 3 (2009): 263-84. 
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MM: In your own attempts to break away from the images, pictures, and assorted social pressures that 
operate as normalizing forces on the body—that is, which break what you refer to as the ‚match de-
manded between aesthetic and proprioceptive‛ [ST 131]—you write about your experience with yoga. Is 
this an extension of your Foucauldian exhortation that one develop greater humility about one’s will to 
truth and your concern about the implications this has for feminist philosophy? I am asking, in part, 
because I’d like to know more about how your yoga practice fits with your scholarly work. 
 
CJH: I wrote about yoga because I was doing a lot of it while writing the book, and because it 
was the one place where I felt I was really practicing in a transformative way—as opposed to 
writing about what it would be, hypothetically, to practice.  (Of course this also shows how 
politically isolated I have become, working in the academy and living in a very conservative 
part of Canada, but that’s another story.)  The new project I’m working on will centre on alter-
native somatic practices and their relation to politics.  Interestingly, after finishing Self-Trans-
formations I tried to move my practice to the “next level,” by taking a lengthy retreat, and I 
found myself getting injured very early on.  I kept on going with my injury and then got more 
injuries.  I really pushed myself into a place of serious physical and mental pain, and then 
when the retreat ended I felt I never wanted to do yoga ever again.  I took six months off from 
practice and spent a lot of it at my chiropractor’s office!  I had a lot of shame and guilt about 
that experience; I’ve always found it very psychologically difficult to maintain a regular solo 
yoga practice, and just quitting in that way at my stage felt profoundly hypocritical as well as 
like a personal failure to follow through on my own projects.  I had just explained to everyone 
publicly for the first time how potentially transformative yoga is for somaesthetics, and then 
suddenly I hated it!  That experience made me interested in the ways that any practice can be 
co-opted by habits we’ve learned under normalisation, and in the kind of necessary sup-
porting framework for self-transformative practices that might make this less likely to happen.  
Anyone thinking about how somatic practices (yoga, but also the Feldenkrais method, martial 
arts, meditation techniques, and so on) are political is going to have to confront the problem of 
how these practices can be brought into political shared space and given a more explicitly 
intersubjective and socially transformative cast, and so that’s the direction of my thought now-
adays. 
 
MM: Self-Transformations concludes on a rather mystical note, I think, when you say of your yoga 
practice, ‚I don’t really know what to say about this experience, philosophically, without delving into 
spiritual and psychological literatures that take me in an unanticipated and unknown direction.‛ [ST 
132] Do you have any further thoughts on this? 
 
CJH: By the time I got to the end of Self-Transformations—and I always leave the conclusion 
(and preface) to the very end of the process—I was really amazed by how far away from the 
beginning I was.  That sentence you quote is, among other things, my way of saying “I’ve got 
really surprisingly eccentric and if I say anything else I’ll start sounding like Khalil Gibran. 
Better stop now.”  I thought it worth just remarking on the way my own writing life exempli-
fies my philosophical claim.  Absolutely there is mystical experience behind the sentiment, but 
I just didn’t want to take that experience and turn it into philosophical fodder. In this I am 
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reminded of some of Wittgenstein’s earlier aphorisms when he says that “it’s not how the 
world is that is mystical, but that it is.”11  For him the mystical was unspeakable; rather, the 
mystical reveals itself.  
 
MM: If one is constrained and enabled by normalization, then how can one practice parrhesia?  Ladelle 
McWhorter asks this, I believe, with her question, ‚how can I affirm the ‘truth’ of my normalized… 
(homo)sexual ‘identity’ while at the same time I refuse the cancellation of freedom and the foreclosure of 
becoming that sexual identities have produced?‛12 You offer this question in Self-Transformations as 
an entry into your reflections on speaking about dieting from the ‚contradictory position‛ of critical 
observer and participant. [ST 66]  In what ways is it possible to speak the truth from such a position? 
Does one hazard becoming trapped in a kind of conflict of interest such that the truth is obscured? 
 
CJH: I don’t think of questions of objectivity and truth using the model that the phrase “con-
flict of interest” implies—at least not in the context of this kind of example.  We all “have” a 
normalized identity, and so there is really no alternative than to speak from “within the 
position.”  Those who think they can be disinterested are typically over-invested in dominant 
identities that they haven’t understood as identities—a familiar enough methodological and 
political claim, I think.  Of course, lots of people don’t really care about dieting and weight all 
that much (which one cannot say about sexual identity—in part, as I suggest, because it has a 
longer history), but that’s not exactly the point.  The point is that the politically significant 
subject-position is that of the normalized individual who nonetheless has an ambivalent, 
critical relation to structures of normalization.  Who wants to hear from a feminist who thinks 
that dieting is just an example of silly false consciousness?  How patronising, and how episte-
mically uninteresting!  The place from which meaningful parrhesia can happen is the place 
where we are cognizant of our own history, and recognise it as our “truth,” yet continue as 
individuals to resist the specific practices that want to draw us ever-deeper into an over-
determined, painfully normalized future.  In writing about something as mundane—and, 
frankly, abject—as Weight Watchers, I wanted to show that one could want to lose weight, 
could want the assistance of a disciplinary technology, and yet could also learn from the ex-
perience in ways that exceed and challenge its stated goals, its ideology, its practices, and its 
mechanisms for instilling docility.  I find it very interesting that many people say that reading 
my work has put them off joining a weight loss group.  Yet my work is, among feminist 
critiques, probably the most accepting in its analysis, emphasising the positive, capacity-
enhancing aspects of such groups.  This shows, I think, that false consciousness models (for 
example), while they have their moments, have very little political traction for most women. 
 
MM: At the end of Self-Transformations you mention and then leave open a number of interesting 
projects, questions and concepts—‚somaesthetics,‛ [ST 123ff] for instance. Could you remind us of the 
                                                 
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus, trans. Daniel Kolak (Mountain View, California: 
Mayfield, 1998), 6.44. 
12 Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), 180. 
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line of thought that leads you to describe ‚somatic‛ askeses as a complement to the agential possibilities 
you explore? Have you pursued this work since writing Self-Transformations? 
 
CJH: I have been developing a couple of papers in which I talk about the gap that exists for me 
between teaching philosophy of the body, and teaching yoga.  It’s so revealing the way we talk 
endlessly in the humanities about “the body” (even that phrase is telling) but academics are, 
by and large, an incredibly somatically dissociated bunch!  It’s very rare in a humanities class-
room that anyone will undertake a self-consciously physical activity aimed at illuminating 
some intellectual point.  We are physical beings only in the un-self-conscious sense that we sit 
at our desks and (usually) use our mouths to speak and our hands to write.  Lots of political 
theorists claim interest in “the body,” and Foucault does a better job than most, but even in his 
work I don’t think there’s much sense of how embodied experience matters in the world—for 
reasons that have to do, of course, with his emphasis on the structural determination of 
subjectivity.  So I find all this stuff really rather removed from lived experience even as it pur-
ports to be accounting for it.  On the other hand, there is a whole world of “alternative” soma-
ticians out there—from Reichian therapists to Pilates instructors to aikido masters—sur-
prisingly many of whom manage to get by with no articulated theoretical vision of the politics 
of the body.  There are also a lot of bizarre, artifactual folk beliefs about body and character or 
psychosomatics that circulate outside academia that represent themselves as “theories” by 
which one might organise one’s life. So I’m trying to read about and practice some of these 
very different things in order to create a somaesthetic space that can talk in an intelligently 
theoretical way about embodied practices and can show why a practice-oriented physicality 
might be central to philosophy as an art of living. 
  
MM: You write that ‚Foucault consistently resists any theory of the subject in favour of a pragmatic 
recognition that making power more flexible and multivalent will open up new possibilities for thinking 
and acting—a project we are already tacitly inclined to consider politically valuable. Whether this move 
can ground a philosophically adequate account of freedom is a question I cannot do justice to here.‛ [ST 
118] Do you have any thoughts on how an account of freedom might be grounded even in the face of 
scepticism, or how to support a refusal to accept normalized trajectories so we can, as you quote 
McWhorter, ‚begin to experience ourselves as other than what we have been made to be?‛ [ST 119] 
 
CJH: This is, I think, the other big question for my current work. I was clear in Self-Trans-
formations (I hope) that not all possibilities for acting are a priori valuable; rather it’s the way 
the technologies of the self I theorised tend to close down our possibilities at the price of im-
plicating us in certain forms of suffering that renders us unfree.  I’m not going to argue that 
suffering is always bad, or even that suffering is readily identifiable as such, but I guess my 
next work is going to look at the relation between freedom and suffering.  I’d like to say—
between freedom and joy, but that is going to take a bit more empirical research! 
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